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Abstract
In a binary prediction market in which risk-neutral traders have heterogeneous
prior beliefs and are allowed to invest a limited amount of money, the static rational
expectations equilibrium price is demonstrated to underreact to information. This
eﬀect is consistent with a favorite-longshot bias, and is more pronounced when prior
beliefs are more heterogeneous. Relaxing the assumptions of risk neutrality and
bounded budget, underreaction to information also holds in a more general asset
market with heterogeneous priors, provided traders have decreasing absolute risk
aversion. In a dynamic asset market, the underreaction of the first-period price is
followed by momentum.
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1 Introduction
Prediction markets are incentive-based mechanisms that employ the general ability of
asset markets to aggregate population beliefs. It is often argued that forecasts generated
by prediction markets are more accurate and less expensive than those obtained through
more traditional methods, such as opinion polls or judgement by experts.1 Partly thanks
to their track record as forecasting tools, there is growing interest in using prediction
markets to collect information for the purpose of improving decision making in business
and public policy contexts.2
Given the simplicity of the trading environment and the availability of data on realized
(and reasonably exogenous) outcomes, prediction markets oﬀer economists an interesting
laboratory to confront theories with evidence on the informational eﬃciency of markets.3
This paper explores the theoretical properties of prediction markets as forecasting tools
with the objective of drawing implications for asset pricing. The central question we
address is how asset prices resulting from a competitive trading process relate to the
posterior beliefs of market participants.
Typically, prediction markets target unique events, such as the outcome of a presidential
election or the identity of the winner in a sport contest. Given that market participants
have limited experience with the underlying events, it is natural to allow individual traders
to have heterogeneous prior beliefs–these initial opinions are subjective and thus are
uncorrelated with the realization of the outcome.4 Having diﬀerent prior beliefs, traders
gain from trading actively.5
While trade in prediction markets may be motivated by traders’ heterogeneous prior
beliefs, designers of these markets typically are interested in extracting the information
possessed by market participants.6 Therefore, our model allows individual traders to have
access to information about the outcome–information has an objective nature because
1See, for instance, Forsythe et al. (1992) and Berg et al. (2008) on the track record of the Iowa Electronic
Markets since 1988.
2See Hanson (1999), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), and Hahn and Tetlock (2005).
3Indeed, the Iowa Electronic Markets were developed mostly for educational purposes.
4For the purpose of our analysis, traders’ subjective prior beliefs play the role of exogenous parameters,
akin to the role played by preferences.
5In the context of more general financial markets, Hong and Stein (2007) survey a large body of evidence
that points to heterogeneity of opinions.
6As Aumann (1976) notes, “reconciling subjective probabilities makes sense if it is a question of im-
plicitly exchanging information, but not if we are talking about ‘innate’ diﬀerences in priors.”
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it is correlated with the outcome.7 Information can be revealed to other traders and the
prediction market designer through changes in the price.
In order to clearly distinguish prior belief heterogeneity from information, we make two
convenient assumptions. First, we focus on a setting in which the price fully reveals all
private information. Without this convenient restriction, the extent of heterogeneity across
posterior beliefs would not be constant because the amount of residual private information
would depend on the particular realized price.8 Second, we assume that traders agree on
how to interpret information (i.e., that beliefs are concordant). Thus, diﬀerences in the
posterior beliefs of traders are uniquely due to diﬀerences in their prior beliefs.
Our baseline model considers a simple prediction market for a binary event, such as
the outcome of a presidential election. Traders can take positions in two Arrow-Debreu
contingent assets, each paying one dollar if the corresponding outcome occurs. In our
formulation, each trader’s initial endowment is constant with respect to the outcome re-
alization. Taking into account a typical institutional feature of prediction markets, we
constrain the wealth each trader can invest in the market.9
In a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium (REE), traders make correct in-
ferences from prices, given common knowledge of the information structure and of the
prior beliefs. If the resulting equilibrium price is to behave like a posterior belief of the
market based on (all) available information, the implied ex ante belief obtained by invert-
ing Bayes’ rule should behave as a prior belief. However, we show that the implied ex
ante belief for the market is not independent of the particular information realization, and
thus does not behave as a prior belief for the market. Actually, the implied ex ante belief
changes systematically in the opposite direction of the information realization.
Our main result is that the market price underreacts to information. When the informa-
tion is more favorable to an event, resulting in a higher market price for the corresponding
asset, the implied market ex ante belief is lower. Equivalently, more favorable information
7This distinction between prior beliefs and information is standard. An individual updates her belief
when learning someone else’s information. When exposed instead to the prior belief of another individual,
the same individual would not be led to revise her belief.
8Because the assumption that the market reaches a fully revealing equilibrium is not warranted for
some market rules, ours is the most optimistic scenario for information aggregation. See Plott and Sunder
(1982 and 1988) and Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) for experimental investigations of the conditions
leading to equilibrium in settings with diﬀerential private information.
9For example, traders in the Iowa Electronic Markets are allowed to wager up to $500, as also explained
in footnote 13. The analysis also applies to general financial markets in which traders can borrow a limited
amount of money.
3
yields a higher market price, but the price increment is smaller than it would be if the
price were to respond to information as a Bayesian posterior probability for the event. In
this sense, the equilibrium price underreacts to information. This result leads to a new
explanation for the favorite-longshot bias, a regularity that is widely documented in the
empirical literature on betting markets.
To understand the logic driving this underreaction result, consider a prediction market
written on which finalist, Italy or Denmark, will win the World soccer championship.
Suppose that the risk-neutral traders are subjectively more optimistic about Italy winning,
the further south is their residence. In equilibrium, traders south of a certain threshold
latitude spend the maximum amount of money allowed to buy the Italy asset, while,
conversely, traders north of the threshold latitude bet all they can on Denmark.
Now what happens when traders overall possess more favorable information about Italy
winning? In the fully revealing REE, this information will be revealed and will cause the
price for the Italy asset to be higher, while contemporaneously reducing the price for the
Denmark asset, compared to the case with less favorable information. As a result, the
southern traders (who are optimistic about Italy) are able to buy fewer Italy assets, which
are now more expensive–while the northern traders can aﬀord, and end up demanding,
more Denmark assets (now cheaper). Hence, there would be an excess supply of the
Italy asset and excess demand for the Denmark asset. For the market to equilibrate,
some northern traders must turn to the Italian side. In summary, when information more
favorable to an outcome is available, the marginal trader who determines the price has a
prior belief that is less favorable to that outcome. Through this countervailing adjustment,
the heterogeneity in priors dampens the eﬀect of information on price.
So far we presented our underreaction result in a setting with risk-neutral traders
who are restricted to risk a bounded amount of wealth. As we show, the result also
holds under the empirically plausible assumption that traders have decreasing absolute
risk aversion, even when there is no exogenous bound on the amount of wealth traders
can invest or borrow. In this more general asset exchange model, the equilibrium price
can still be meaningfully interpreted as a generalized average of traders’ posterior beliefs.
But, again, when favorable information is revealed, traders who take long positions on the
asset that now becomes more expensive suﬀer a negative wealth eﬀect, and hence cut back
their position because they become more risk averse. Thus, the generalized belief average
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assigns a lower weight on the beliefs of traders with priors that are in line with the realized
information. Again, price underreaction results.
When viewed as special financial markets, a defining feature of prediction markets is
that traders have constant endowments across states of the world. Therefore, prediction
markets oﬀer an ideal setting to investigate how market prices react to information when
traders have heterogeneous beliefs. In a dynamic extension of our model, we find that the
initial price underreaction is followed by price momentum. As such our analysis uncovers
a novel mechanism that can contribute to the understanding of why prices in financial
markets are widely observed to underreact to information and exhibit momentum (or
post-announcement drift).10
As explained in Section 7, this paper integrates classic results from the literature on
belief aggregation (starting with Wilson, 1968, Lintner, 1969, and Rubinstein, 1974) with
work on the role of prices as aggregators of information (Grossman, 1976 and Radner,
1979). In the presence of wealth eﬀects, we show that the market price underreacts to
information because it allocates an increased weight to traders with beliefs that point
in the opposite direction to the realized information. Our model uses the same mix of
ingredients (heterogeneous priors, private information, general risk preferences, and REE)
as Milgrom and Stokey (1982). To their setting, we add the comparative statics of how
the equilibrium resulting in the first round of trade depends on the information available
to the market, as well as a characterization of the correlation of price changes over time.11
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our baseline model with risk-
neutral traders. Section 3 derives the equilibrium and gives a parimutuel re-interpretation.
Section 4 demonstrates the general interdependence of information and belief aggregation
and the occurrence of the favorite-longshot bias. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case
with risk-averse traders. Section 6 shows that momentum arises in a natural dynamic ex-
tension of the model. Section 7 details the paper’s contribution to the literature. Section 8
concludes. Appendix A collects all proofs. Appendix B analyzes a version of the model
with heterogenous endowments but common prior.
10Following Jagadeesh and Titman (1993), there is now a large empirical literature documenting mo-
mentum eﬀects in asset prices. Hong and Stein (1999) propose a diﬀerent informational theory of under-
reaction and momentum. They assume that information diﬀuses gradually and is not fully understood by
all traders, unlike in our fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
11Milgrom and Stokey (1982) instead focus on the price adjustment that follows the arrival of new
information in a second period, after the first round of trade has occurred.
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2 Baseline Model
Our model is inspired by the rules of the Iowa Electronic Markets for a binary prediction
market, in which traders can take positions on whether an event, , is realized (e.g., the
Democratic candidate wins the 2008 presidential election) or not. There are two Arrow-
Debreu assets corresponding to the two possible realizations: one asset pays out 1 currency
unit if event  is realized and 0 otherwise, while the other asset pays out 1 currency unit
if the complementary event  is realized and 0 otherwise.12
Traders enter the market by first obtaining an equal number of both assets. Essentially,
the designer of the prediction market initially endows each trader  with 0 units of each
of the two assets. One important feature of the market is that there is a limit on how
much money each trader can invest.13 After entering the market, traders can exchange
their assets with other traders. A second key feature of the market is that traders are not
allowed to hold a negative quantity of either asset. As explained below in more detail,
these two restrictions (on the amount of money invested and on the number of assets a
trader can sell) impose a bound on the number of asset units that each individual trader
can purchase and eventually hold.14
Markets clear when the aggregate demand for asset 1 precisely equals the aggregate
demand for asset 2. We normalize the sum of the two asset prices to one, and focus on
the price  of the asset paying in event .
We assume that there is a continuum  of risk-neutral traders who aim to maximize
their subjective expected wealth.15 Trader  maximizes  () + (1− ) (), where
 denotes the trader’s subjective belief. We now turn to the process that determines the
trader’s subjective belief, .
Initially, trader  has subjective prior belief . Before trading, trader  privately ob-
12The state of the world is given exogenously and cannot be aﬀected by the traders. This assumption
is realistic in the case of prediction markets on economic statistics, such as non-farm payroll employment.
When applied to corporate decision making, prediction market traders might have incentives to manipulate
the outcome. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007) analyze outcome manipulation, disregarding the wealth eﬀect
on which we concentrate in this paper.
13For example, in the Iowa Electronic Markets each trader cannot invest more than $500. Exemption
from anti-gambling legislation is granted to small stake markets created for educational purposes.
14Our main result (Proposition 2) hinges on the property that this bound is endogenous to the model,
because the number of assets each trader eventually holds depends on the market-clearing prices.
15The results derived in this section immediately extend to the case of risk-loving traders, whose behavior
is also to adopt an extreme asset position. We turn to risk-averse traders in Section 5.
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serves signal . Conditional on state  ∈ {}, we let  (|) denote the joint proba-
bility density of the signal vector  = {}∈ .16 The likelihood ratio for signal realization
 is defined as  () =  (|)  (|). The only constraint imposed on the signal dis-
tribution is that there is zero probability of fully state-revealing signals, so  () ∈ (0∞)
with probability one. If trader  observes the realized signal vector , then by Bayes’ rule
the subjective posterior belief  satisfies

1−  =

1−  () . (1)
Hence,  () is a suﬃcient statistic for the vector .
For convenience, we normalize the aggregate endowment of assets to 1. The initial
distribution of assets over individuals is described by the cumulative distribution function
. Thus,  () ∈ [0 1] denotes the share of all assets initially held by individuals with
subjective prior belief less than or equal to . We assume that  is continuous, and that
 is strictly increasing on the interval where  ∈ {0 1}.17
We assume that the model (i.e., preferences, prior beliefs, and signal distributions) and
the rationality of all traders are common knowledge. This means that all traders agree on
the conditional distributions  (|), even though they have heterogeneous prior beliefs.
In the terminology of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), traders have concordant beliefs.18 We
will assume that the market arrives at a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium
(REE). By definition, the price then varies with the realized signal in such a way that the
suﬃcient statistic  is revealed by the price; the price function  () is injective.
Discussion of Assumptions. Before proceeding, we discuss our main assumptions: het-
erogeneous priors, concordant beliefs, and rational expectations equilibrium. Our results
crucially depend on the heterogeneity of prior beliefs across traders.19 We depart from
16We do not assume that the signals are conditionally independent across traders. Indeed, a large
number of conditionally independent signals would lead to full revelation of the state. By allowing for
conditional dependence, our model encompasses the realistic scenario in which traders overall do not
possess full information about the outcome.
17The assumption that the priors are continuously distributed is made to simplify the analysis, but is
not essential for our underreaction result. See the discussion in footnote 24.
18Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995) relax this assumption by
allowing traders to interpret a publicly observed signal diﬀerently. We refer to Morris (1994 and 1995a)
for a characterization of the general conditions for no-trade theorems when the interpretation of new
information diﬀers across traders.
19As in most work on heterogeneous priors, prior beliefs are given exogenously in our model. We refer
to Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007) for a model in which
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the parsimonious assumption that traders share a common prior mostly on grounds of
realism. The common prior assumption is sensible when agents are dealing with objective
uncertainty and with commonly experienced events. Prediction markets deal instead with
settings in which traders are unlikely to have experienced similar events in the past. Given
that in these settings there is no commonly agreed-upon probability from the outset, it is
realistic to assume that the traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs.20
Second, our assumption that traders have concordant beliefs serves to make our main
result particularly striking. Even though each and every individual trader’s belief is up-
dated in a Bayes rational way in response to the perfectly revealed information, the market
price moves by less than Bayes’ rule would predict. Note the strength of the theory that
there is no restriction on the distribution of the information, as summarized by . The only
important assumption is that traders and the market designer agree on the interpretation
of this information.
A final question is whether it is appropriate to consider the rational expectations equi-
librium when priors are heterogeneous. We find it plausible that individuals make some
inferences about the state from the realized price in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion. Even though these inferences need not be as correct in reality as they are assumed
be in a REE, it is a strength of our theory that it works under this narrow, standard
assumption.21
3 Equilibrium
This section characterizes the fully revealing REE resulting when traders are allowed to
exchange assets with other traders in a competitive market.22 By normalization, the prices
of the two assets sum to one, and we focus on the equilibrium determination of the price
heterogeneous prior beliefs arise endogenously.
20In addition, note that the common prior assumption is not an implication of rational decision making.
An alternative approach would have been to relax the rationality assumption by positing, for example,
that traders employ a wrong information model.
21Morris (1995b) shows that the REE concept in general relies on strong common knowledge assump-
tions. In the present setting, we are implicitly assuming that the heterogeneous prior distribution, ,
is common knowledge. Such an assumption is no stronger than the usual REE assumption that traders
commonly know each others’ preferences, for here the subjective prior belief is akin to a parameter char-
acterizing individual preferences.
22We focus on the necessary properties of this equilibrium, while Radner (1979) discusses suﬃcient
conditions for its existence.
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 for the asset that pays out in event .
The fully revealing REE price is a suﬃcient statistic for the likelihood ratio  (). For
every , trader ’s demand solves this trader’s maximization problem, given belief  ()
satisfying (1), and given market price  (). Market clearing requires the price to be such
that aggregate net demand is zero, or that the aggregate holding of each asset equals
aggregate wealth (normalized to 1).
Solving the choice problem of the risk-neutral traders is straightforward. Suppose
trader  has information with likelihood ratio  resulting in a posterior belief equal to ,
and suppose that the market price is . The subjective expected return on the asset that
pays out in event  is −, while the other asset’s expected return is (1− 1)−(1− ) =
−. With the designer’s constraint on asset portfolios, individual demand thus satisfies
the following: if   , trader  exchanges the entire endowment of the  asset into
(1− )0 units of the  asset. The final portfolio is then 0 units of the  asset
and 0 of the  asset. Conversely, when   , the trader’s final portfolio is 0 of the
 asset and 0 (1− ) of the  asset. Finally, when  = , the trader is indiﬀerent
between any trade.
Proposition 1 The fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium price, , is the unique
solution to the equation
 = 1−
µ 
(1− )+ 
¶
(2)
and is a strictly increasing function of the information realization .
Our analysis permits the diﬀerent interpretation that a publicly revealed signal with
likelihood ratio  is observed before trade takes place. In the fully revealing REE, after 
is realized the resulting market price and asset allocation constitute an equilibrium of the
perfect information economy.
Parimutuel Interpretation. Given our focus on REE, the equilibrium is invariant with
respect to the specific rules used for market trading. To illustrate this point, we now oﬀer
a parimutuel reinterpretation of our equilibrium. Suppose that the amount  was bet
on outcome  ∈ {} in a parimutuel betting market. Every unit bet on outcome 
returns 1 +  units if  is true, where  (1 + ) =  + = 1. The market’s implied
probability for outcome  is defined as  =  ( +) =  = 1 (1 + ).
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This parimutuel market has an REE which is equal to the rational expectations equi-
librium above.23 Suppose that the implied market probability is . Again solving the
utility maximization problem of trader , we find the following demand: trader  will bet
the amount 0 on event  if   , and bet the amount 0 on event  if instead   .
Note that if  is a fully revealing REE price, then market clearing implies that
 = 1−
µ 
(1− )+ 
¶
= 
from which it follows that, indeed,  = .
4 Underreaction to Information
Using Bayes’ rule (1), we can always interpret the price as the posterior belief of a hy-
pothetical market agent with initial belief  [(1− )+ ]. This implied ex ante belief
for the market then may be interpreted as an aggregate of the heterogeneous subjective
prior beliefs of the individual traders. Our main result is that this aggregate market belief
depends in a systematic fashion on the information that is initially available to traders.
This means that the aggregation of beliefs cannot be separated from the realization of
information.
Proposition 2 If beliefs are truly heterogeneous, i.e.  6=  for some pair of traders,
then the implied ex ante belief for the market

(1− )+ 
is strictly decreasing in .
The arrival of more favorable pre-trade information yields a higher market price that
nevertheless underreacts to the information. Consider the inference of an observer (such
as the market designer, any of the traders, or a truly outside observer) who desires to
extract information from the market price. Given common knowledge of the model and
23As argued by Ottaviani and Sørensen (forthcoming a) and (forthcoming b), the assumption that the
market reaches an REE might be unrealistic if traders take simultaneous positions in a parimutuel market.
Instead, here we consider the most optimistic scenario for information aggregation by allowing traders to
observe the equilibrium price. See also the discussion in Section 7.
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the observation of a price that reveals information , this observer’s posterior probability,
 (), for the event  derived from any fixed prior belief  satisfies (1), or
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
= log
µ 
1− 
¶
+ log (3)
The expression on the left-hand side is the posterior log-likelihood ratio for event , which
clearly moves one-to-one with changes in log. Proposition 2 implies that this observer’s
belief reacts more than the price:
Proposition 3 If beliefs are truly heterogeneous, then for any two diﬀerent information
realizations   0,
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
− log
µ  (0)
1−  (0)
¶
 log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
− log
µ  (0)
1−  (0)
¶
 0 (4)
To understand the intuition for this underreaction result, consider what happens when
traders have information more favorable to event  (corresponding, say, to the Democratic
candidate winning the election), i.e., when  is higher. According to (2), the price of the
 asset, , is clearly higher when  is higher. Now, this means that traders who are
optimistic about a Democratic victory can buy fewer units of asset , because the bound
0 is decreasing in . In addition, traders who are pessimistic about a Democratic
victory can buy more units of asset , which they want to buy. If all the traders who
were purchasing  before the increase in  were still purchasing  at the higher price that
results with higher , there would be insuﬃcient demand for . Similarly, there would
also be excess demand for . To balance the market it is necessary that some traders who
were betting on the Republican candidate before now change sides and put their money on
the Democratic candidate. In the new equilibrium, the price must change to move traders
from the pessimistic to the optimistic side. Thus, the indiﬀerent trader who determines
the equilibrium price at the margin holds a more pessimistic prior belief about Democratic
victory, the more favorable to Democratic candidate (i.e., the higher) the information, ,
is. Hence, although the price, , rises with the information, , it rises more slowly than a
posterior belief, because of this negative eﬀect on the prior belief of the marginal trader.24
24Our assumption that prior beliefs are distributed continuously in the population is not essential for
the result. If the population is finite, or there are gaps in the distribution, then there can be ranges
of information, , over which the equilibrium price is constant. In that case, the rational expectations
equilibrium cannot fully reveal , but can reveal the information needed for the proper allocation of
the assets. Underreaction would still hold, but only relative to the limited information revealed by the
equilibrium price.
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The underreaction result derived in this section is driven by the restriction on the
amount of money invested (see footnote 13) and, therefore, on the number of assets a
trader can sell. In turn, this restriction imposes a bound on the number of assets that
each individual can purchase and eventually hold. The result hinges on the fact that this
bound (equal to 0) is inversely related to the equilibrium price.25
Proposition 3 oﬀers a new informational explanation of the favorite-longshot bias, a
widely-documented fact in the empirical literature on betting markets (see Thaler and
Ziemba, 1988, and Snowberg and Wolfers, 2005).26 The bias says that outcomes favored
by the market occur more often than if the market price is interpreted as a probability–
and, conversely, longshots win less frequently than suggested by the market price. To see
how this eﬀect arises in our context, compare the market price,  (), with the posterior
belief,  (), held by an outside observer with (fixed) prior belief :
Proposition 4 If beliefs are truly heterogeneous, there exists a market price ∗ ∈ [0 1]
with the property that  ()  ∗ implies  ()   (), and  ()  ∗ implies  () 
 ().
There is a threshold level, ∗, for the realized market price, such that a market price
below ∗ classifies event  as a longshot and a market price above ∗ makes  a favorite.
The observer expects longshots to occur less often than indicated by the market price, and
favorites to occur more often.
Comparative Statics. We are now ready for the key comparative statics result of the
paper. We show that underreaction is more pronounced if traders’ heterogeneous beliefs
are more dispersed. In analogy with Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1970) definition of mean
preserving spread, define distribution 0 to be a median-preserving spread of distribution
 if  and 0 have the same median  and satisfy 0 () ≥  () for all  ≤  and
0 () ≤  () for all  ≥ .
25Suppose, instead, that the market designer were to impose a direct cap on the number of assets
that each trader can buy, rather than on the budget each trader can invest. Then, for a large range of
information realizations, the same fixed set of optimists (or pessimists) would buy the full allowance of the
 (or ) asset. Since the sets of optimists and pessimists are constant, there would be no underreaction.
However, typically in prediction markets there is an upper bound on the traders’ budget, rather than on
the number of nominal positions they can take.
26Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) report that the favorite-longshot bias has been observed in a prediction
market for Standard and Poor’s 500 index.
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Figure 1: This plot shows the posterior probability for event  as a function of the market
price  for the  asset, when the prior beliefs of the risk-neutral traders are uniformly
distributed ( = 1 in the example). The dotted line is the diagonal.
Proposition 5 Suppose that 0 is a median-preserving spread of , denoting the common
median by . Then, more underreaction results under 0 than under :   (1−) 
implies  ()   ()  0 ()  12, and   (1−)  implies  ()   () 
0 ()  12.
This result is in line with empirical evidence by Verardo (2007) that momentum profits
are significantly larger for portfolios characterized by higher heterogeneity of beliefs.
Example. To illustrate our results, suppose that the distribution of subjective prior be-
liefs over the interval [0 1] is  () = 
h
 + (1− )
i
, where   0 is a parameter that
measures the concentration of beliefs. The greater is , the less spread is this symmetric
belief distribution around the average belief  = 12. For  = 1 beliefs are uniformly
distributed, as  → ∞ beliefs become concentrated near 12, and as  → 0 beliefs are
maximally dispersed around the extremes of [0 1]. The equilibrium condition (2) becomes
log
µ 
1− 
¶
= log
⎛
⎝
1−
³ 
(1−)+
´

³

(1−)+
´
⎞
⎠ =  log
µ
(1− )

¶
,
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so that the market price  () satisfies the linear relation
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
=

1 +  log.
Hence,  (1 + ) ∈ (0 1) measures the extent to which the price reacts to information.
Price underreaction is minimal when  is very large, corresponding to the case with nearly
homogeneous beliefs. Conversely, there is an arbitrarily large degree of underreaction when
beliefs are maximally heterogeneous (i.e.  is close to zero).
Assume that a market observer’s prior is  = 12 for event , consistent with a
symmetric market price of  (1) = 12 in the absence of additional information. The
posterior belief associated with price  then satisfies
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
= log = 1 +  log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶

As illustrated in Figure 1 for the case with uniform beliefs ( = 1), the market price
overstates the winning chance of a longshot and understates the winning chance of a
favorite by a factor of two.
5 Risk Aversion
So far we have assumed that each individual trader is risk neutral, and thus ends up
taking as extreme a position as possible on either side of the market. Now, we show that
our result extends nicely to risk-averse individuals, under the plausible assumption that
traders’ absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, even when no exogenous bounds are
imposed on the amounts that traders can invest.
Model. Realistically, suppose that each trader is endowed with the same number 0 of
each asset. To properly capture the eﬀect of risk aversion, we suppose that each trader  is
also characterized by an initial, state-independent level  of additional wealth.27 Trader
 maximizes subjective expected utility of final wealth,  ( ())+(1− ) ( ()),
where  is the trader’s subjective belief. We suppose that  is twice diﬀerentiable with
0  0 and 00  0, and satisfies the DARA assumption that the de Finetti-Arrow-Pratt
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, −00 0, is weakly decreasing in wealth, . The
27See Musto and Yilmaz (2003) for a model in which, instead, traders are subject to wealth risk, because
they are diﬀerentially aﬀected by the redistribution associated with diﬀerent electoral outcomes.
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cumulative distribution function  again describes the distribution of subjective beliefs,
and it is assumed to satisfy the same properties as before. Private information is distributed
as before.
Let ∆ denote the choice variable of trader , such that ∆ units of the  asset are
exchanged for (1− )∆ units of the  asset. Note that this is a zero net value trade,
since the asset sale generates (1− )  |∆| of cash that is spent on buying the other asset.
The final wealth levels in the two states are
 () = + 0 + (1− )∆ (5)
and
 () = + 0 − ∆ (6)
To properly connect with the previous model, we maintain the trading constraints that
∆ ∈ [−0 (1− )  0]. We stress that our main results hold regardless of whether
these constraints are binding.
Equilibrium. Given price  and posterior belief , trader  chooses ∆ to maximize
posterior expected utility  ( ()) + (1− ) ( ()). If the trading constraints
are not binding, then the choice satisfies the necessary first-order condition

1− 
0 ( ())
0 ( ()) =

1−  (7)
The endogenously determined net trade ∆ then satisfies the standard condition that the
marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio. In particular, a trader with  = 
will choose  () =  (), corresponding to ∆ = 0. A trader with a posterior belief
 above the price  will choose ∆  0. Note that the trading constraint does not bind,
unless the trader is nearly risk neutral or the diﬀerence between  and  is suﬃciently
large. In analogy with Proposition 1 we have:28
Proposition 6 There exists a unique fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
The price, , is a strictly increasing function of the information realization .
28The DARA assumption implies a monotonicity of the demand function, which plays an important
role in the proof of this result. With Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA) preferences, monotonicity
may fail. Existence of a unique fully revealing equilibrium REE also holds for IARA preferences for which
monotonicity hold–in which case overreaction rather than underreaction results. We focus on the DARA
case because it is empirically more plausible.
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Belief Aggregation with CARA Preferences. Suppose first that the traders have
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions, with heterogeneous degrees of
risk aversion, such that  () = − exp (−), where   0 is the constant coeﬃcient of
risk tolerance, the inverse of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Denoting the relative
risk tolerance of trader  in the population by   =  R 10  (), we have:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the traders have CARA preferences and heterogeneous be-
liefs. Define an average prior belief  by
log

1−  =
Z 1
0
  log 
1−  () 
and for each individual let
∗ =  log
µ − 
 − 
¶
 (8)
Suppose that 1+0 inf ∗  0 sup ∗ . When the realized information  is in the range
satisfying
1 +
0
inf ∗ ≤

+ 1−  ≤
0
sup ∗ (9)
then the fully-revealing REE price satisfies Bayes’ rule with market prior , i.e.,  () =
 (+ 1− ). When  falls outside this range, the price underreacts to changes in 
compared to Bayes’ rule.
Risk aversion allows for the possibility that no trader meets the constraint. This
is more likely to happen when 0 is large, as also suggested by condition (9). With
CARA preferences and when no trader is constrained, trader  chooses net demand ∗ in
equilibrium. The market price thus behaves as a posterior belief and there is no bias.
This result for the case with CARA preferences and unconstrained positions is consis-
tent with Varian’s (1989) analysis. As shown by Wilson (1968), under CARA preferences
the traders’ heterogeneous priors can be aggregated. Once private information is added,
the price then behaves as a posterior belief.29
29Note that in the very special case in which all traders share the same common prior,  = , they have
all the same posterior,  = , so that by (7) there is no trade and the price satisfies Bayes’ rule as well.
Note that this result follows regardless of the degree of risk aversion of individual traders. Thus, provided
one maintains Grossman’s (1976) second assumption that traders share a common prior, the equilibrium
price behaves like a posterior belief regardless of his CARA assumption. Our underreaction result below
obtains by relaxing simultaneously both of these two assumptions made by Grossman (1976).
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Underreaction with DARA Preferences. We have seen that CARA preferences lead
to an unbiased price reaction to information when the trading constraints are not binding
in equilibrium. Now we verify that, for strict DARA preferences, a bias arises in the
price, whether traders are constrained or not. When  rises, the rising equilibrium price
yields a negative wealth eﬀect on any optimistic individual (with   ) who is a net
demander (∆  0). Conversely, pessimistic traders benefit from the price increase.
With DARA preferences, the wealth eﬀect implies that optimists become more risk averse
while pessimists become less risk averse. An increase in  thus must shift weight from
optimists to pessimists when the market price is calculated as a belief average. Hence,
although the price rises with , it rises less fast than a posterior belief, because the weight
is shifted more to pessimists when information is more favorable.
Proposition 8 Suppose that beliefs are truly heterogeneous and that all individuals have
strict DARA preferences. Then the market price underreacts to information, as¯¯¯¯
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
− log
µ  (0)
1−  (0)
¶¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
− log
µ  (0)
1−  (0)
¶¯¯¯¯
for any  6= 0.
Example with Logarithmic Preferences. Suppose that prior beliefs are uniformly
distributed over the interval [0 1], with  () = , and traders have logarithmic pref-
erences,  () = log, satisfying the DARA assumption. In order to highlight the
diﬀerence between Propositions 3 and 8, namely the inclusion of individuals with an
interior solution to their maximization problem, we again remove completely the ex-
ogenous bound on the wealth invested. The individual demand function solving (7) is
∆ = ( + 0) ( − )  [ (1− )]. The equilibrium price is then an average of the
posterior beliefs,
 () =
Z 1
0
 ()  =
Z 1
0

+ (1− )  (10)
For  6= 1, integration by parts of (10) yields  () =  (− 1− log)  (− 1)2. If we
keep fixed  (1) = R 1
0
  = 12 as the prior belief of the outside observer, the favorite-
longshot bias can be illustrated in a graph with the same qualitative as Figure 1.
Edgeworth Box Illustration. We now present a graphical illustration of the logic
of Proposition 8 for an economy with two types of traders (with prior beliefs 1  2)
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Figure 2: Edgeworth box representation of the underreaction result for the case with
DARA preferences and interior solution. The wealth expansion paths are linear for the
special case with logarithmic preferences.
and no exogenous bounds on the wealth traders can invest. As represented in Figure 2,
the Edgeworth box is a square because there is no aggregate uncertainty. The initial
endowment, , lies on the diagonal, being the same in the two events:  () =+0 =
 (). If traders are strictly risk averse, they have strictly convex indiﬀerence curves,
which are not drawn to avoid cluttering the picture. The slope of the indiﬀerence curves
at any safe allocation is − (1− ) = − (1− ). Thus, for any allocation along
the diagonal, the indiﬀerence curve for trader 2 (optimist) is steeper than for trader 1
(pessimist).
We focus on interior equilibria in which the exogenous trading constraints are not
binding. When information  is available and revealed, the marginal rates of substitution
of the two traders are equalized at the equilibrium allocation, ∗. Thus, the equilibrium
allocation lies above the diagonal, and the optimistic trader 2 is a net buyer for asset .
How is the equilibrium aﬀected by an exogenous change in information to 0  ? As a
result of this change in information, indiﬀerence curves become steeper by a factor of 0.
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For the sake of argument, suppose that the price were to change without any underreaction
from the original  () to the Bayes-updated 0 =  ()0 ( ()0 + (1−  ())). At
allocation ∗, the marginal rates of substitutions are still equalized, and the straight line
dividing the two traders’ preferred sets has slope −0 (1− 0). However, since 0  ,
this straight line passes through the diagonal below the initial endowment point, proving
that ∗ cannot be the new equilibrium allocation. Maintaining price 0, the new budget
line must pass through the initial endowment. As this new budget line is further up on
the diagonal compared to the one passing through ∗, we see illustrated here the positive
wealth eﬀect for the pessimistic trader 1 and the negative wealth eﬀect for the optimistic
trader 2.
We now turn to the implication of this wealth eﬀect. Given price 0, the choice ∗1
would be optimal for trader 1, if the true budget line were passing through ∗. This
point lies above the diagonal in the Edgeworth box. Now, as it is well known since Arrow
(1965), DARA implies that the wealth expansion paths diverge from the diagonal. The
richer trader 1 demands a riskier bundle (further away from the diagonal) by increasing
1 () − 1 (), whereas the poorer trader 2 demands a safer bundle (closer to the
diagonal) by decreasing 2 () − 2 ().30 Therefore 0 cannot be an equilibrium after
the exogenous information change. To reach an equilibrium both traders must shift their
portfolio towards lower  ()− () so as to eliminate the excess demand for asset 
as well as the excess supply for asset . This is achieved by a relative reduction in the
price for asset , so that  (0)  0. Thus, prices must underreact to information.
6 Dynamic Extension: Momentum
In this section we extend our model to a dynamic setting in which information arrives
sequentially to the market after the initial round of trade. We verify that there exists an
equilibrium where the initial round of trade is captured by our baseline model, and where
there is no trade in subsequent periods, consistent with Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) no
trade theorem. We then show that the initial under-reaction of the price to information
implies momentum of the price process in subsequent periods–if the initial price movement
30The trader’s choice problem can be reformulated with a safe asset, always paying 1, and a risky
asset paying 1 in  and −1 in . The richer trader demands more units of the risky asset, and hence
| ()−  ()| rises.
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is upwards, prices subsequently move up on average. Intuitively, first-round information
is swamped by the information revealed in subsequent rounds, and hence over time the
price comes to approximate the correctly updated prior belief.
In this model, the constant set of traders  is initially in the same situation as in our
baseline model. Each trader is allowed to trade at every time date  ∈ {1     } at
the competitive price . The joint information received by traders up until period  has
likelihood ratio . The asset position of trader  after trade at period  is summarized by
∆. At time  + 1 the true event is revealed, and the asset pays out. Each trader aims
to maximize the expected utility of period  + 1 wealth, which consists of other wealth
 and prediction market wealth  .
Before we have characterized the static equilibrium that corresponds to the case  =
1. When   1, a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is defined as fol-
lows. First, for every  = 1      there is an injective price function  (). By con-
vention, +1 = 1 when  is true, and +1 = 0 when  is true. Second, given
these price functions, every trader  chooses a strategy of net positions ∆ () in
order to maximize expected utility of final wealth. By convention, ∆0 = 0. The
trader’s prediction market wealth evolves randomly over time as  () = −1 (−1) +
( ()− −1 (−1))∆−1 (−1) for  = 1      + 1, with 0  0 specified by the
market designer as before. If constrained, the trader’s prediction market wealth must
always stay non-negative, meaning that the net position choice at  − 1 is constrained
by ∆−1 (−1) ∈ [−−1 (−1)  (1− −1 (−1))  −1 (−1) −1 (−1)]. Finally, in
every period  at any information  realization the market clears, R∆ ()  () = 0.
Proposition 9 There exists a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the dy-
namic trade model with the following properties. In the first round of trade, the price
1 (1) is equal to the static equilibrium price  (1) characterized before. In all subse-
quent periods there is no trade, so ∆ () = ∆ of the static equilibrium, and the price
satisfies Bayes’ updating rule,
 ()
1−  () =

1
1 (1)
1− 1 (1) . (11)
The marginal trader, who holds belief  (1) =  (1) after the first round of trading,
remains the marginal trader in future rounds. The market price in future periods is the
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Bayesian posterior of this belief updated with the newly arriving information. From this
trader’s point of view prices follow a martingale, i.e.,  [ () |0 ] = 0 (0) for all 0  .
Every trader who is initially more optimistic than this marginal trader, and hence has
first-round posterior  (1)   (1) and has chosen ∆  0, believes that the price is a
sub-martingale (trending upwards). Despite this belief, the no-trade theorem establishes
that such a trader does not wish to alter the position away from the initial ∆. The
position already reflects a wealth- or risk-constrained position on the asset eventually
rising in price, and there is no desire to further speculate on the upward trend in future
asset prices.
The underreaction to the first-period information implies momentum in returns, consis-
tent with the findings of Jagadeesh and Titman (1993). If the information revealed in the
first period is favorable, i.e. if the realized likelihood ratio satisfies 1  1, then the trader
with neutral prior belief  =  (1) joins the group of optimists taking long positions on .
From the natural point of view of an observer with a prior belief equal to this neutral prior,
how are prices expected to behave? We show that prices trend upwards (downwards) in
expectation following the initial realization of favorable (unfavorable) information.
Proposition 10 Suppose that beliefs are truly heterogeneous and that all individuals are
constrained or have strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Fix the market
prior at the natural level  =  (1). When non-degenerate new information  arrives
to the market in later trading periods, then prices exhibit momentum, in the sense that
changes in prices in later periods are positively correlated with early changes in prices. For
any 1  2  0
 [(1 (1)− 2 (2)) (2 (2)−  (1))]  0 (12)
Price changes are positively correlated with the opening price; in a regression of price
changes on earlier price changes there should be a positive coeﬃcient. Thus, the initial
underreaction must be followed by a correcting price momentum. Although the present
analysis focuses on a period of trade opening, and immediately subsequent periods, our
results apply more broadly to trading environments in which the arrival of new information
coincides with trade–either because of added liquidity reasons or diﬀerential interpretation
of information, from which the present analysis abstracts.
Proposition 10 is also consistent with the seemingly conflicting findings on price drift
recently documented by Levitt and Gil (2007) and Croxson and Reade (2008) in the
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context of sport betting markets. On the one hand, Levitt and Gil (2007) find that the
immediate price reaction to goals scored in the 2002 World Cup games is sizeable but
incomplete and that price changes tend to be positively correlated, as predicted by our
model. On the other hand, Croxson and Reade (2008) find no drift during the half-time
break, thus challenging the view that the positive correlation of price changes during
play time indicates slow incorporation of information. Consistent with this second bit of
evidence, our model predicts the absence of drift when no new information arrives to the
market, as it is realistic to assume during the break when the game is not played. This
results follows immediately from Proposition 10 when  = 0 = 00 for all periods  in
the break {0  00}.
7 Contribution to Literature
This paper bridges the gap between the literature on trade with heterogeneous beliefs and
the REE literature on information aggregation through prices. In an important paper on
betting, Ali (1977) formulates a static model in which risk-neutral bettors with limited
wealth have heterogeneous beliefs about a binary outcome. Ali shows that if the bettor
with the median belief thinks that one outcome (defined to be the favorite) is more likely,
then the equilibrium fraction of parimutuel bets on this outcome is lower than the belief of
the median bettor. By identifying the belief of the median bettor as the correct benchmark
for the empirical probability, Ali concludes that the favorite is underbet as compared to
the longshot. Following Ali, the fledgling literature on belief aggregation in prediction
markets (Manski, 2006, Gjerstad, 2005, and Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2005) analyzes the
relation between the equilibrium price and the average belief of traders, depending on the
traders’ preferences for risk. In this literature, traders do not make any inference from
market prices.
But if the traders’ beliefs really have information content (about the empirical proba-
bility of the state), their positions should depend on the information about these beliefs
that is contained in the market price. This tension underlies the rational expectations
critique of the Walrasian approach to price formation with heterogeneous beliefs (see, e.g.,
the discussion in Chapter 1 of Grossman, 1989). Unlike the prediction market literature,
we remain agnostic about the relationship between (the distribution of prior) beliefs and
the empirical chance of the outcome. Instead, we conduct a comparative statics exercise
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with respect to information realizations. Ours is the appropriate theoretical benchmark
for empirical testing, because the diﬀerent opinions underlying the heterogeneous priors
of traders have no information content and, thus, should have no bearing on the empirical
probabilities. We show that changes in the realized information translate in less than
one-for-one changes in the market price–the variation in information is dampened by the
market.
Following Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Morris (1996) there is also
an extensive literature in which active trade results from heterogeneous prior beliefs, in
the absence of information. Our model departs from this finance literature (surveyed by
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2004) in two key ways. First, risk-neutral traders are not wealth
constrained in Harrison and Kreps (1978), but the market is incomplete, so that traders
can take positions on only one side of the market. Thus in their model, the entire net
supply of the asset is held by the most optimistic trader, whose belief determines the
market price. This trader’s belief then can be taken as the market belief, so there is no
informational favorite-longshot bias. In our model, instead, markets are complete, but the
wealth that can be invested is constrained either exogenously or endogenously through
risk aversion–thus our model is perfectly symmetric by imposing a limit on the amount
of wealth that can be invested (either for long buying or for short selling). Second, we
allow traders with heterogeneous priors to also have private information, unlike in most of
this literature with the exception of some of the models discussed below.
On the other hand, the REE literature typically assumes that traders have a common
prior belief, so that diﬀerences in beliefs across agents can be attributed only to private
information (Grossman, 1976). Under the common prior assumption, the price reacts one-
for-one to information, regardless of risk attitudes (see footnote 29 above). Under CARA,
heterogeneous beliefs can be aggregated (Wilson, 1968, Lintner, 1969, and Rubinstein,
1974), and thus the price again behaves as a posterior belief (see Proposition 7 above).31
Our underreaction result thus holds once we depart from Grossman’s (1976) characteriza-
tion of REE by allowing for both heterogeneous priors and wealth eﬀects. As compared to
Varian’s (1989) generalization of Grossman (1976) to heterogeneous priors, here we further
introduce the possibility of wealth eﬀects by imposing a limit on the amount that traders
31On the optimal allocation of risk with heterogeneous prior beliefs and risk preferences but without
private information, see also the recent developments by Gollier (2006).
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can invest (in Section 2’s baseline model) or, more generally, by relaxing the assumption
of constant absolute risk aversion (in Section 5’s general model).32
The positive characterization we initially provide focuses on the REE that results when
privately informed traders with heterogeneous priors are asked to trade once.33 Thus, we
contribute to the REE literature the characterization of the interaction of heterogeneous
beliefs and information in the first round of trade. Our analysis complements Milgrom
and Stokey (1982), who focus instead on the subsequent rounds of (no) trade that follows
the arrival of additional information (with concordant beliefs). In the dynamic version of
the model, we also characterize the co-variation of price changes over time and obtain a
simple and novel mechanism for momentum.
We also share our focus on the interaction of private information with heterogeneous
priors with a handful of papers on betting. Notably, Shin (1991 and 1992) considers asset
pricing by an uninformed monopolist bookmaker in a market in which some traders take
positions on the basis of their beliefs while others are perfectly informed about the outcome.
Morris (1997) characterizes the equilibrium in a game-theoretic model of bilateral betting
with asymmetric information and heterogeneous priors. As in these contributions, in our
model heterogeneous beliefs coexist with private information, but we focus here on the
competitive equilibrium.
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) analyze a dynamic noisy REE model with overlapping
generations of traders. In their model, traders with short horizons are subject to noise,
which makes prices partially revealing. Because of their short-term bias, traders must
forecast the next period average forecasts and so end up overweighting the common public
information.34 Our mechanism behind the underreaction to information is instead driven
by income eﬀects that are absent in Allen, Morris, and Shin’s (2006) model with CARA
preferences. Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (forthcoming) further investigate the conditions
for momentum with CARA preferences. Deviating from the REE framework, momentum
results when traders react to their private information, but are assumed not to react the
32Once we allow for heterogeneous priors, we stress the wealth eﬀect introduced by either one of these
two channels is suﬃcient to result in underreaction in our setting.
33This market-opening scenario is particularly relevant for prediction markets (which are often created
with the express purpose of aggregating information and beliefs already held by traders), but is also valid
for financial markets with constant inflows of new traders and changes in the state of the world.
34Kyle (1989) notes that prices may overreact in a noisy REE, when risk-averse traders require a risk-
premium for accommodating noisy demand, positively correlated with the price.
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information contained in the equilibrium price because they are unable to recognize the
information of other traders. Instead, we analyze the implications of belief heterogene-
ity within the REE setting with concordant beliefs, where traders fully incorporate the
information available to them and to other traders.35
Our analysis could be extended to a partially revealing REE. However, the residual
private information not revealed by the market then generates private belief heterogene-
ity that may, in general, depend on the realized . In principle, there could then be a
systematic relationship between favorable information and the extent of belief heterogene-
ity. This additional mechanism is reminiscent of the eﬀect of short-selling constraints in
a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) setting, as explored by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987).
When the realized news is negative, short-sale constrained informed traders are less fre-
quently encountered in the market, and it takes longer for the market to learn negative
news. Diamond and Verrecchia conclude, however, that the market maker continues to
quote unbiased prices given the available information.
Finally, our explanation for underreaction is distinct from the one proposed by Ot-
taviani and Sørensen (forthcoming a) and (forthcoming b). In their setting, individual
traders have common prior beliefs and they are unable to condition their behavior on the
information that is available to the other traders. In the model formulated here, instead,
we allow traders to perfectly share information through the trading process and oﬀer a
complementary explanation that crucially relies on the heterogeneity of prior beliefs. An
important advantage of the explanation proposed here is that it does not depend on par-
ticular specifications of the market structure.
8 Conclusion
Prediction markets are special financial markets in which traders’ endowments are constant
with respect to diﬀerent outcome realizations. Our model of these markets has three key
ingredients: heterogeneous priors, private information, and limited positions. First, market
participants do not share a common prior belief because there is genuine uncertainty about
the underlying event. Second, the market designer typically is interested in aggregating
35We assume that traders extract information from the market price. To further appreciate the fun-
damental diﬀerence between the two settings, note that in Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer’s (forthcoming)
static model with unconstrained traders, underreaction immediately results even with CARA preferences,
in contrast to our Proposition 7.
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the private information of participants–so it is natural to allow for the presence of this
information. Third, prediction market traders are allowed to wager only a limited amount
of wealth, so their positions are bounded. While these three ingredients are inspired by
the special features of prediction markets, they are also relevant for more general financial
markets (see Hong and Stein, 2007).
In this setting, the REE price reveals all the traders’ private information, but under-
reacts to information. This result is driven by a wealth eﬀect arising because traders with
heterogeneous beliefs take speculative net positions. Underreaction also results when the
risk-neutral traders are allowed to invest any amount they wish, provided that they have
finite wealth and that they can borrow a finite amount of money–as it is the case in
financial markets. Even in the absence of any exogenous bound on positions or without
borrowing constraints, underreaction holds under the realistic assumption that traders
become less risk averse when their wealth increases. The general lesson is that the incor-
poration of information into the market price is intertwined with (and cannot easily be
separated from) the aggregation of subjective priors whenever there are wealth eﬀects.
Is it natural to wonder whether income eﬀects would lead to underreaction to infor-
mation in a more traditional setting with common priors, but heterogenous endowments.
Appendix B investigates how prices react to information in the presence of wealth eﬀects
in a financial market in which gains from trade are generated by idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Extending Rubinstein’s (1974) results to allow for private information, we show that there
is no underreaction bias when traders have common prior but heterogeneous endowments,
provided they have Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) with common cautious-
ness parameters. For example, if all traders have logarithmic preferences (our leading
DARA example analyzed in Section 5) the price behaves as a posterior belief when traders
have heterogeneous endowments, but common prior. Intuitively, all liquidity-motivated
traders take more (or less) extreme positions, as the available information varies. With
heterogeneous beliefs, instead, optimists (who buy) buy less on favorable information,
while pessimists (who sell) sell more, so that the price must equilibrate in a direction
contrary to information. Thus, heterogeneity of priors is important for underreaction and
cannot be replaced by heterogeneity in endowments across individuals.
We see our analysis as a first step toward understanding information aggregation in
markets with wealth eﬀects. Beyond the setting with two states on which we concentrate
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in this paper, the wealth eﬀect underlying our results introduces an additional channel
through which information aﬀects prices: information about the likelihood of a state rela-
tive to a second state can impact the price of the asset for a third state. The adjustment
related by this contagion eﬀect can induce overreaction to information in the relative
prices of the assets for the first two states, as can be shown through simple examples. A
general analysis of how prices react to information in the presence of wealth eﬀects and
heterogeneous priors is a challenging but promising problem for future research.36
36With the notable exception of Grossman (1978), most of the REE literature obtaining positive char-
acterizations of equilibrium prices follows Grossman (1976) in restricting attention to CARA preferences
and normally distributed returns. In our two-state model, instead, we can be fully general about risk
preferences and information, as well as allowing for heterogeneous priors.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. For a given likelihood ratio , the prior of an individual with
posterior belief  is, using (1),  =  [(1− )+ ]. The  asset is demanded in
amount 0 (1− ) by every individual with   , or equivalently    [(1− )+ ].
The aggregate demand for this asset is then  ( [(1− )+ ])  (1− ). In equilibrium,
this aggregate demand is equalized to the aggregate supply, equal to 1, resulting in equa-
tion (2).
We complete the proof by noting that the price defined by (2) reveals , because it
is a strictly increasing function of . The left-hand side of (2) is a strictly increasing
continuous function of , which is 0 when  = 0 and 1 when  = 1. For any  ∈ (0∞),
the right-hand side is a weakly decreasing continuous function of , for the cumulative
distribution function  is non-decreasing. The right-hand side is equal to 1 at  = 0,
while it is 0 at  = 1. Thus, there exists a unique solution, such that  ∈ {0 1}. When 
rises, the left-hand side is unaﬀected, while the right-hand side rises for any , strictly so
near the solution to (2) by the assumptions on . Hence, the solution  must be increasing
with . ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The market price  is the posterior belief given information 
and market prior belief  [(1− )+ ]. When  increases, so does . By equation (2),
when  increases,  [(1− )+ ] must fall, because the cumulative distribution function
 is non-decreasing. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 1,  ()   (0). By (3), (4) is equivalent to
log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
− log
µ  (0)
1−  (0)
¶
 log− log0
or
()
1−()
1
 
(0)
1−(0)
1
0 
Using the strictly increasing transformation  →  (1 + ) on both sides of this inequality,
it is equivalent to
 ()
[1−  ()]+  () 
 (0)
[1−  (0)]0 +  (0) 
which is true by Proposition 2. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 3, the function
Ψ () = log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
− log
µ  ()
1−  ()
¶
is strictly increasing in . Hence, one of the following three cases will hold. In the first
case, there exists an ∗ ∈ (0∞) such that Ψ () is negative for   ∗ and positive for
  ∗ – in this case, the result follows with ∗ =  (∗). In the second case, Ψ () is
negative for all , and the result holds for ∗ = 1. In the third case, Ψ () is positive for
all , and the result is true with ∗ = 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. Note first that  ((1−) ) = 12 by (2). Consider now
  (1−)  such that the equilibrium prices satisfy  ()   ()  0 ()  12. If,
contrary to the claim,  ()  0 (), then (2) implies that

µ  ()
(1−  ())+  ()
¶
= 1−  ()  1− 0 () = 0
µ 0 ()
(1− 0 ())+ 0 ()
¶

Further, 0 ()
(1− 0 ())+ 0 () 
 ()
(1−  ())+  () 
while 0 ()  12 in equilibrium implies
0 ()
(1− 0 ())+ 0 ()  
Thus, the median preserving spread property implies the contradiction,

µ  ()
(1−  ())+  ()
¶
 0
µ 0 ()
(1− 0 ())+ 0 ()
¶

A similar argument applies when   (1−) . ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. The individual trader solves the problem
max∆∈[−0(1−)0]
 ( ()) + (1− ) ( ()) 
Strict concavity of  ensures that the maximand ∆ is unique. By the Theorem of
the Maximum, ∆ is a continuous function of  and . We first show that the op-
timizer ∆ is strictly decreasing in  and weakly increasing in , strictly so when
∆ ∈ (−0 (1− )  0).
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The constraint set [−0 (1− )  0] does not depend on  and falls in Veinott’s
set order when  rises. The trader’s objective function  ( + 0 + (1− )∆) +
(1− ) ( + 0 − ∆) has first derivative
 (1− )0 ( ())− (1− ) 0 ( ())
with respect to ∆. Since 0  0 the cross-partial of the objective with respect to the
choice variable ∆ and the exogenous  is strictly positive, and hence ∆ is weakly
increasing in , strictly so when the unique ∆ optimizer satisfies (7). A suﬃcient
condition for a strictly negative cross-partial with respect to ∆ and  is
∆ [ (1− )00 ( ())− (1− ) 00 ( ())]  0. (13)
Using the first order condition for optimality, the second factor of (13) is positive if and
only if
−
00 ( ())
0 ( ())  −
00 ( ())
0 ( ()) 
By the DARA assumption, this inequality holds if and only if  ()   (), i.e.,
∆  0. Hence the cross-partial is strictly negative, and it follows that ∆ is strictly
decreasing in .
Equilibrium is characterized by the requirement that the aggregate purchase of asset
 must be zero, i.e., R 1
0
∆ (  )  () = 0. When  = 0, every trader has   
and hence ∆  0, while the opposite relation holds when  = 1. Individual demands are
continuous and strictly decreasing in , so there exists a unique equilibrium price in (0 1).
When  is increased,  () rises, and hence ∆ rises for every trader. The price must
then be strictly increased, in order to restore equilibrium. Finally, since the equilibrating
price  is thus a strictly increasing function of , the equilibrium price schedule is fully
revealing. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose for a moment that no trader is constrained in equilib-
rium. The necessary and suﬃcient first order condition (7) for the unconstrained optimum
is solved by
∆ =  log
µ
1−  ()
 ()
 ()
1−  ()
¶
. (14)
Market clearing occurs when
R 1
0
∆ () = 0. By (14) and using  ()  (1−  ()) =
 (1− ) this is solved by  () =  (+ 1− ). Inserting this market price in
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the individual demand (14), the resulting equilibrium demand is ∗ , as given in (8). This
analysis describes the equilibrium, provided no individual is constrained. The lower bound
constrains no individual when 0  inf ∗ ≥ −0 (1−  ()), or equivalently  () ≥
1 + 0 inf ∗ . Likewise, the upper bound is equivalent to  () ≤ 0 sup ∗ .
When a positive mass of traders are constrained, the bias follows from the argument
of Proposition 8 reported below. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8. The result follows as in the proof of Proposition 3, once
we establish that log [ ()  (1−  ())] − log () is strictly decreasing in . Suppose,
for a contradiction, that log [ ()  (1−  ())] − log () is non-decreasing near some .
Traders at the boundary∆ = −0 (1− ) have their demand decreasing in , and hence
∆  0. Likewise, ∆  0 at the other boundary ∆ = 0. We will argue
in the next paragraph that the same eﬀect holds for traders satisfying (7). Since market
clearing
R 1
0
∆ ( ()   )  () = 0 implies R 10 [∆ (  ) ]  () = 0, we will
then obtain a contradiction establishing the claim.
Since log[()(1− ())]−log () is constant, (7) implies that 0 (()) 0 (())
is non-decreasing in . Using the expressions for the final wealth levels (5) and (6), non-
negativity of the derivative of 0 ( ()) 0 ( ()) implies that
00 (())0 (())
£
(1− ) ∆ −∆ 
¤ ≥ −00 (())0 (()) £∆ +∆ ¤ 
The second derivative of the utility function is negative, so this implies
∆
 ≤ ∆


00 ( ())0 ( ())− 00 ( ())0 ( ())
(1− )00 ( ())0 ( ()) + 00 ( ())0 ( ()) . (15)
On the right-hand side of (15),   0 by Proposition 6, and the denominator is
negative. Recall that ∆  0 if and only if  ()   (). By DARA, this implies that
−
00 ( ())
0 ( ())  −
00 ( ())
0 ( ())
or that the numerator is positive. Likewise, when ∆  0, the numerator is negative. In
either case, the right-hand side of (15) is strictly negative. Hence, ∆  0 for every
trader who satisfies the first-order condition (7). ¤
Proof of Proposition 9. We verify that the described outcome is an equilibrium. First,
we know from before that 1 (1) is injective. From (11), also  () is injective. For the
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final equilibrium condition, note that the market will clear because trader positions are the
same as in the static REE. The remainder of the proof verifies that this constant position
is indeed optimal in the individual optimization problem.
Suppose at period , information  has been realized. To save notation, write 
for the realization of  () and  for the realization of  (). Two observations are
essential. First, ∆ is at the upper bound (interior, lower bound) of the constraint set
[− (1− )  ] if and only if, for all +1,∆ is on the upper bound (interior, lower
bound) of the constraint set [−+1 (+1)  (1− +1 (+1))  +1 (+1) +1 (+1)].
Second, for all realizations of the string (+1      ), the feasible choice ∆ ( ) =
   = ∆+1 (+1) = ∆ implies
0 ( +  ())
0 ( +  ()) =
0 ( +  + (1− )∆)
0 ( +  − ∆) 
Both observations follow from the wealth evolution equation  () = −1 (−1) +
( ()− −1 (−1))∆−1 (−1) for periods  = + 1      .
To prove our claim that the trader in every period selects the same position ∆ =
∆1 (1) as in the static model given price 1 (1), we proceed by backwards induction.
The induction hypothesis  states that the agent in period  given price  () (i) chooses
∆ to satisfy the static first-order condition
 ()
1−  () =
 ()
1−  ()
0 ( +  () + (1−  ())∆)
0 ( +  ()−  ()∆)
if feasible, or (ii) chooses∆ =  ()  () if the left hand side of this static condition
is below the right hand side at this choice, and (iii) chooses ∆ = − ()  (1−  ())
if the left hand side of this static condition exceeds the right hand side at this choice. Note
from the previous two essential observations, that once we have proved the induction
hypothesis for all , we have ∆ ( ) =    = ∆1 (1), and ∆1 (1) is the solution to
the individual problem in Proposition 6.
The induction hypothesis  is satisfied because the static first-order condition char-
acterizes the solution to the remaining one-period problem. We now assume that the
induction hypothesis is true at +1      , and will prove that induction hypothesis   
is true. Suppose at period , information  has been realized. Final wealth will be
 () = +  + (+1 (+1)− )∆ + (1− +1 (+1))∆+1 (+1)
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and
 () = +  + (+1 (+1)− )∆ − +1 (+1)∆+1 (+1)
where ∆+1 (+1) is the reaction prescribed by induction hypothesis  + 1. The time 
problem is
max∆∈[−(1−)]
 () [ ( ()) |] + (1−  ()) [ ( ()) |]
where the expectations are taken over the realization of +1. In case (i), the static first-
order condition can be satisfied with an interior choice of ∆. Evaluated at this choice,
the derivative of the time  objective function is, by the envelope theorem,
 () [(+1 (+1)− ) 0 ( ()) |]
+ (1−  ()) [(+1 (+1)− )0 ( ()) |]
= 
h()0( ()) (+1 (+1)− ) |i
+(1− )
h
(1−())0( ())
1− (+1 (+1)− ) |
i

Here  () and  () are constant across realizations of +1. The static first-order
condition then allows us to rewrite the derivative with respect to the control variable as
 ()0 ( ())
 {[+1 (+1)− |] + (1− )[(+1 (+1)− ) |
]} 
By the martingale property of Bayes-updated prices at market belief , we have
[+1 (+1)− |] + (1− )[(+1 (+1)− ) |] = 0
Thus, the first order condition for optimality of ∆ is satisfied at the choice resulting
from the static model. The two other cases (with constrained choices) follow likewise.
Proof of Proposition 10. For a given realization of 2, we denote for simplicity the
resulting price by  = 2 (2) and the natural posterior by  = 2 (2 + 1− ).
Under the natural posterior, we have
[1 (1)− |2 ] = [1 (1)− |] + (1− )[1 (1)− |]
= ( − ) {[1 (1)− |]−[1 (1)− |]} 
using the martingale property of prices at the market belief . Next,
1 (1) = 11 + (1− )2 = +
(1− )  (1 − 2)
1 + (1− )2
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follows from equation (11). At 2, there is uncertainty about the realization of the future
1. Bayes’ rule implies 12 = 2 (1|) 2 (1|) where 2 denotes the p.d.f. for
1. Collecting these pieces, we obtain
[1 (1)− |2 ] = ( − )
Z ∞
0
(1− )  (1 − 2)
1 + (1− )2 (1 − 2) 2 (1|
) 1 
Now, averaging over realizations of 2 , we find
 [(1 (1)− 2 (2)) (2 (2)−  (1))]
=  [ [(1 (1)− 2 (2)) (2 (2)− ) |2 ]]
= 
∙
(2 (2)−) ( (2)−2 (2))
Z ∞
0
(1−2(2))2(2)(1−2)
2
2(2)1+(1−2(2))2
2(1 |) 1
¸

Underreaction states that (2 (2)− ) ( (2)− 2 (2))  0 for all 2 6= 1. Since all
terms in the expectation are positive, we have proved (12). ¤
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Appendix B: Heterogeneous Endowments and Common Prior
In Proposition 8, traders are motivated to actively trade from the initial allocation
because they have heterogeneous prior beliefs. It is natural to wonder how essential is the
heterogeneous prior assumption for the result that the price does not react one-for-one to
information. In particular, would wealth eﬀects lead to underreaction more generally when
traders are motivated to trade because of traditional liquidity motives (e.g., risk-sharing
when individual endowments depend on the state), even when they share a common prior
belief? This appendix shows that the price reacts one-for-one to information for a broad
class of preferences, which include our leading logarithmic example from Section 5.
We modify the model from that section by assuming that all traders share the common
prior , but allowing trader’s  initial endowment, (0 ()  0 ()), to vary across states,
0 () 6= 0 (). For simplicity, we do not constrain the positions traders can take.
Suppose that there exists constants  and  such that trader  has Hyperbolic Absolute
Risk Aversion (HARA), −00 () 0 () = 1 ( + ). The fact that  is constant across
traders means that traders are equally cautious.37
Proposition 11 If all agents have HARA preferences with common cautiousness parame-
ter, then the market price reacts as a Bayesian posterior belief to information.
The result follows from Rubinstein’s (1974) observation that in this case there exists
a representative trader. Denoting the utility function of this representative trader by  ,
the equilibrium price  () must then satisfy the equivalent of (7),

1− 
 0 (0 ())
 0 (0 ()) =
 ()
1−  () 
where 0 () = R∈ 0 ()  and 0 () = R∈ 0 ()  denote the aggregate endow-
ments in states  and . In the special case without aggregate uncertainty (0 () =
0 ()), the market price is equal to the common posterior. More generally, in the pres-
ence of aggregate uncertainty the price still reacts one-for-one to information.
To understand more generally why the logic of Section 5 does not carry over to this
model, reconsider its Edgeworth box illustration. The box is no longer a square when
0 () 6= 0 (). Without loss of generality, suppose 0 ()  0 (). Unlike in
37In the special case with  ≥ 0, the absolute risk aversion 1 is decreasing in . In this case, these
preferences are a special case of DARA preferences. CARA results when  = 0.
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Figure 2, the two risk-averse traders with common prior have an equilibrium bundle on
the same side of their respective diagonal (i.e., 1 ()  1 () and 2 ()  2 ()).
The DARA income expansion paths no longer contradict the possibility of staying in
equilibrium when the price is Bayes updated to information. With general risk-averse
preferences, underreaction or overreaction to information depends on demand elasticity.
To further illustrate the diﬀerence of heterogeneous endowments to heterogeneous pri-
ors, reconsider the model with a continuum of traders with logarithmic preferences. Log-
arithmic preferences correspond to our leading DARA example from Section 5 and belong
to the HARA class with  = 0 and common cautiousness parameter  = 1. Denote by 
the common posterior belief given information . The first-order condition for ∆ is

1− 
0 ()− ∆
0 () + (1− )∆ =

1−  (16)
Solving for equilibrium using (16) and market clearing,
R
∈ ∆ = 0, we obtain

1− 
0 ()
0 () =
 ()
1−  ()  (17)
Combining (16) with (17), trader ’s net asset position is
∆ = 
µ
0 ()− 0 (
)
0 () 0 ()
¶

Thus, in this risk-sharing model, trader  has a long (or short) equilibrium asset position,
∆  0 (or ∆  0), when  is initially endowed with less (or more) of the  asset than
the aggregate market. The size of the asset position, |∆|, is increasing in . Now note
that the expected return from the first asset,

 = (1− )
0 ()
0 () + 
is strictly monotone in  when 0 () 6= 0 (). If 0 ()  0 () then all traders
take more extreme positions when  increases–and, conversely, they all take less ex-
treme positions if instead 0 ()  0 (). In this setting, when the price responds to
information as a posterior belief, buyers buy more aggressively when sellers sell more ag-
gressively. Thus, there is no reweighing across traders and no countervailing adjustment in
the price depending on the realized information, . With heterogeneous beliefs, instead,
we found that optimists (who buy) buy less, while pessimists (who sell) sell more when 
increases–so the price had to equilibrate against the direction of the information.
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